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Durkheimian anthropology 
and religion
Going in and out of each other’s bodies
Maurice Bloch, London School of Economics 
and Political Science
 In memory of Skip Rappaport
Emile Durkheim’s work has always been criticized for reifying the social and situat-
ing it in an indeterminate zone between actors’ consciousness and positive facts.1 In 
this chapter, however, I am not concerned with exploring whether this criticism of 
the founder of French sociology’s work is justiﬁed. My purpose instead is to show 
that it is possible to retain some aspects of Durkheim’s conclusions about the nature 
of religion and of the social with types of argument quite different from those he 
employed. My framework here is that of modern evolutionary natural science and 
recent understandings of the speciﬁcities of the human mind/brain. 
Such an evolutionist perspective tends to make social/cultural anthropolo-
gists uncomfortable. I hope that as they read on, they discover that an evolutionist 
perspective does not necessarily lead to the dangers they envision; and that it can 
even be reconciled with some of their most cherished ideas that will emerge all the 
stronger as a result.
Editors’ Note: This is a reprint of Bloch, Maurice. 2007. “Durkheimian anthropology and 
religion: Going in and out of each other’s bodies.” In Religion, anthropology, and cogni-
tive science, edited by Harvey Whitehouse and James Laidlaw, 63–88. Ritual studies 
monograph series. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. We thank the author for 
granting permission to reprint this essay and we remind the reader that we retain the 
style of the original.
1. An earlier version of this was given to the American Association for the Anthropology 
of Religion as a Rappaport lecture. I would like to thank R. Astuti, E. Keller, G. Orrigi, 
A. Yengoyan, and D. Sperber for comments on an earlier version.
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But because one might as well hang for a sheep as for a lamb, I begin my argu-
ment much further back than is usual in evolutionary anthropology with a con-
sideration of the very earliest stages of life on earth, when unicellular organisms 
associated together to form multicellular units in the Cambrian era.
During this crucial transition, and for millions of years, it was far from clear 
whether those early multicellular organisms were one or many because they were 
in an in-between stage. This biological conundrum still exists, in varying ways and 
to varying degrees, for many subsequent and more complex forms of life. An ex-
treme example is coral, about which one can argue equally plausibly either that 
the minute units of which it consists are separate organisms or that whole coral 
branches (or even whole reefs) are one single animal. 
The difﬁculty of isolating the “individual” does not only apply for such excep-
tional life forms. The issue of identifying the speciﬁc unit on which natural selec-
tion acts arises in respect of all living things and has become particularly acute in 
modern biology. Does natural selection occur at the gene level or on combinations 
of associated genes? Or is it at the level of the individual? Or on a larger group that 
shares genes to differing degrees (Stotz and Grifﬁths 2004)?
This sort of question is particularly problematic when we are dealing with social 
species. Is it the bee or the hive that is the animal? After all, the bees in a hive are 
as genetically identical as are the different bits of the human body, and a hive pos-
sesses only one set of working reproductive organs. 
The biological problems do not end there. When does an embryo become sepa-
rate from its mother? Is a live spermatozoid a unit? More generally, how far are par-
ents one with their children, and are descendants of individuals their continuation 
or new units? Are descent groups one body? Do members of one caste have unique 
distinctive types of blood? Are nations one people? Are we all the children of God 
in the brotherhood of Christ? Is society, as Durkheim claimed, more than the sum 
of the constituent individuals? 
Here, those readers who have already given me up as some sort of biological re-
ductionist, indifferent to the higher purpose of cultural anthropology, might sum-
mon a ﬂicker of interest with these more familiar disciplinary questions. They may 
even begin to hope that I might have something to say about religion and ritual, 
which, after all, is what this book is about. I shall get there . . . eventually. And in-
deed, my prime purpose in this chapter is to consider the theoretical implications 
of the way I have just managed to slither from a discussion of the structure of coral 
to hoary classical subjects in anthropology and even to central tenets of some inter-
pretations of the Christian religion.
If the reader is totally unsympathetic to the approach, however, I propose they 
will already have revelled in identifying a familiar sleight of hand: representing 
facts about the world as if they were just that, without having ﬁrst recited the an-
thropologists’ exorcism prayer.
I humbly acknowledge that everything I say is nothing but an 
epiphenomenon of my present cultural position and time and that this 
inevitably leads me to essentialize a particular cultural position and then 
mercilessly impose it on defenseless people.
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In other words, I have been guilty of suggesting that my scientiﬁc knowledge, a 
mere elitist manifestation of my own culture, is somehow the basis of the proposi-
tions made by those people around the world who say things like this: “The mem-
bers of our group, which has existed since the beginning of time, share a distinctive 
type of bone”; or “Our lineage consists of one body”; or “Initiation reunites us with 
our ancestors”; or “Ask not for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”
I would have thus committed all the category mistakes in the book. Especially in 
having forgotten the fact that the cultural creates an impenetrable screen between 
what is and our cultural representations. Familiar arguments of this kind might be 
partly justiﬁed as ﬁrst steps when we teach an introduction to anthropology,2 but in 
this chapter I argue that when left in categorical form, they are as misleading as the 
ethnocentricism that anthropologists love to denounce.
We can start with a classic and familiar polemic as a way of introducing the 
theoretical position I shall adopt here.
In the bad-old days, so the story goes, anthropologists used to think that kin-
ship was based on the fact that people go in and out of each other’s bodies. Indeed, 
they might have stressed that the physical separation of a child from its mother 
takes quite a while, with intermediate phases such as breast feeding and child care. 
Some of these earlier vulgar anthropologists went as far as to suggest that the care 
given by fathers to infants was somehow the consequence of having gone into the 
mother during sexual intercourse. They argued that these “natural” foundations 
were the common base of all different kinship systems (Yanagisako and Collier 
1987: 30–35).
Such naïveté, however, was soon to be severely disciplined by developments in 
our subject. First, anthropologists stressed the old platonic point that humans do 
not live in the world as God or the scientists see it, but via their own understand-
ing of it (I don’t see why this does not apply to other animals, too). From this they 
argued that the foundation (i.e., going in and out of each other’s bodies) cannot 
be the direct foundation of social knowledge. This correction was, however, soon 
deemed not to have been severe enough. It was not simply that people saw the 
world “through a glass darkly”; it was that they did not see it at all. There was no 
such fact as that people went in and out of each other’s bodies; they were just ac-
cidental cultural representations of which my particular formulation is only one 
among many. Thus, to talk of different, culturally constructed kinship systems as 
if they were cultural interpretations of a single reality was a fallacy. In a wonderful 
metaphor, David Schneider explained that if you went out into the world armed 
with a kinship-shaped cutting tool, you inevitably got kinship-shaped pieces. By 
this he implied that if the tool had had any other shape than the western-shaped 
kinship tool, which would be the case with the tools used by the “others,” you would 
have gotten a quite different shape (Schneider 1984, 198).
I have always liked this metaphor of Schneider’s because, as a child, I used to 
spend much time watching my grandmother making biscuits. She would roll out 
a large flat pancake of dough on the marble of the kitchen table, and with a few 
ancient tin tools she would cut out various shapes. This is exactly what Schneider 
2. They are what would be used to dismiss as irrelevant studies such as those of Cosmides 
and Tooby (1992) about cheater detection.
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has in mind. But the other reason why I like his metaphor is that what is wrong 
with it is also obvious. The world in which people go in and out of each other, the 
denounced foundation, is not (as Schneider’s analogy suggests) inert, undifferenti-
ated, and flat like biscuit dough. It has a shape, and this shape, while it does not 
determine the way the world will be represented, severely restricts the parameters 
of what is likely.
Plato also used a culinary metaphor to talk about the world. For him, however, 
the world was more like a roast chicken than pastry, and unless you really wanted to 
make things difficult for yourself, you would “carve it at the joints,” wherever they 
occurred on the animal you were serving up.
Indeed, it is the dialectic between the facts of sex and birth and the cultural rep-
resentations of these phenomena that most promises to advance our understand-
ing of the nature of human beings, which, of course also involves the cultural (and 
hence historical) aspect. But examination of this dialectic is what the Schneiderian 
rhetoric makes impossible by refusing to allow us to ask what the representations 
“are about” and what the world is like. A trivial objection to the effect that not all 
languages have a word for what anthropologists call “kinship” puts a stop to any 
consideration of the really important questions about our species.
And there is yet something else that is obscured by Schneider’s figure of speech. 
The cutting tools, which represent concepts in the metaphor, also have to be ex-
plained. There is no doubt that these tools are the products of specific histories 
but they nevertheless have had to be usable by the minds of the human beings who 
employ them. Here again, the world interacts in a challenging way with the repre-
sentations that cultural anthropologists study. It is banal to stress merely that the 
world we live in is culturally constructed; what is of interest is the indirect relation 
of the construction to what is constructed and how the construction is used.
This chapter, however, will not pursue the implications of the link between the 
fact that we go in and out of each other’s bodies in birth and sex and the cultural 
representations of this fact in kinship systems. Many (I do not include myself among 
them) might feel that this topic has grown tiresome. I merely evoke the controversy 
to stress that because all cultures interpret, and have to interpret, the fact that we 
go in and out of each other in sex and birth, they also have to interpret the conse-
quent fact that for us (as with coral) there is indeterminacy concerning the physical 
boundaries of individuals. For instance, the so-called “descent theorists” of my an-
thropological youth were fascinated with groups of people who declare themselves 
to be “one body”; in other words, corporate groups. These statements are interest-
ing not because they are flights of fancy proving yet again that the world we live in 
is culturally constructed but because they are in part motivated by the very real fact 
of the indeterminacy and arbitrariness of the boundaries of biological units.
My focus in this chapter concerns another real fact about human beings that, 
although it concerns a matter different from kinship, is not altogether unrelated to 
it. Indeterminacy and arbitrariness of boundaries are not simply the result of the 
sexual character of our species and the way it reproduces itself. They are also due to 
another feature of Homo sapiens. Individuals go in and out of each other because of 
certain characteristics of the human nervous system. This form of interpenetration 
is as material as sex and birth; but unlike sex and birth it is more or less unique to 
our species (Povinelli et al. 2000; Decety and Somerville 2003).
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I have already mentioned that, although the boundaries of individual units are 
arbitrary among all living forms, this ambiguity takes on a special, perhaps more 
extreme form in social animals because the social—of itself and by definition—
continually reconnects the individuals whom time and genealogical distance are 
separating. Such a process occurs in a variety of ways in different life forms because 
of the mechanisms that make the social differ according to the species concerned. 
So it is not surprising that the specific basis of human sociability is a product of 
those capacities of our species that make it distinctive (Humphrey 2002).
One thing that normal human babies do at about 1 year old, but our nearest 
relatives, the chimpanzees, never do, is point at things, not because they want what 
they designate—they do this, but so do chimps—but because they want the people 
around them to pay attention to the same things. In other words, they want the 
people they are with to adjust their minds in harmony with theirs—in short, to 
share intentionality (Gopnik 1993; Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003; Tomasello 1999). 
This demonstrative pointing is one of the first stages of the development of that 
unique and probably most important of human capacities: the ability to “read” the 
mind of others, a capacity that is somewhat oddly referred to as “theory of mind” 
(TOM for short). This ability continues to develop from the age of 12 months on 
until the child reaches the age when it can be shown that the child “knows” that 
other people act in terms of the beliefs or concepts they hold, rather than in terms 
of how the world is (Wimmer and Perner 1983). By “know,” I simply mean that 
the child and, of course, the adult, acts in terms of their reading of the beliefs of 
alter and continually adjusts her behavior accordingly. I do not mean that the per-
son who does this is necessarily conscious of the process (a point to which I shall 
return in a moment). The whole process is far too complex and too rapid for that 
to be possible. Nonetheless, the importance of TOM can hardly be overestimated. 
Those familiar with Gricean theories of linguistic pragmatics will realize that it can 
be argued, convincingly in my opinion, that this continual mind reading is what 
makes linguistic communication, and indeed all complex human communication, 
possible (Sperber and Wilson 1986).
It is legitimate to think that to talk of the mutual mind reading on which our 
social life is based is, at best, simply a metaphor; at worst, a mystification. However, 
I want to stress that the metaphor refers to an empirical phenomenon of interpen-
etration, even though admittedly we don’t stick our finger into each other’s brains 
in some kind of mental intercourse.
Just how material the process of mind reading may be has become clearer in 
the light of recent neurological findings. For instance, many researchers now argue 
that the unique human ability to read the mind of those with whom we interact is 
ultimately based on a much more general feature of the brain that is not confined to 
humans: the so-called “mirror neurones” (Gallese and Goldman 1998).
Perhaps the term is misleading. What is being referred to is an observation 
that has been made possible by modern neural imagery. The term mirror neurones 
means that exactly the same neurones are activated in our brains when, for ex-
ample, we see someone raising their arm to point at the ceiling as when we perform 
the action ourselves. In other words, the action of alter requires from us a part 
of the same physiological process: the neural part as the action of ego. Indeed, a 
moment’s reflection makes us realize that, even without the arcane and somewhat 
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contested biology of mirror neurones, the very nature of human communication 
must involve something like this (Decety and Somerville 2003).3
Let us consider a simple act of linguistic communication. Here I follow Sperber 
and Wilson’s theory of relevance fairly closely (Sperber and Wilson 1986). For my 
message to come across when I say, for example: “Today we honor the memory of 
Roy Rappaport” a mechanism must occur that enables you to penetrate my brain 
and align yours so that its neuronal organization resembles mine. In order to do 
this, we both had to use a tool, sound waves in this case, but it cannot possibly 
be the sound waves, as such, that carried my meaning to you. Sound waves, poor 
things, are just sound waves. The reality is that sound waves enable me to modify 
your brain, or mind, so that its neuronal organization in part resembles mine, ad-
mittedly in a very limited way. And, of course, the ability to communicate in this 
way—to connect our neurones—is what makes culture possible because culture 
must ultimately be based on the exchange of information. This can then be com-
bined with other information and then transformed or reproduced through time 
and across space in a uniquely human way.
The parallel neuronal modification implied by communication has further im-
portant implications. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is possible for 
an individual to create ex nihilo a representation. Such a representation could then 
be said to be under that individual’s control because the process that produced it 
would be hers alone. However, when the representation comes from someone else’s 
brain (i.e., when it comes via the process of communication, which is in fact always 
the case, though to varying extents), the representation of one brain colonizes an-
other. This process, whether it is conscious or subconscious, is the basis of all com-
munication. In such a case, the created neuronal activity of one brain is the material 
existing in another. By this means, the brains of different individuals interpenetrate 
materially so that the boundaries that we believe to be obvious become problem-
atic. What I am saying is very similar to what some writers, especially Ed Hutchins, 
call “distributed cognition” (Hutchins 1995). However, I would distance my argu-
ment from them on one minor point. Hutchins, in talking about this phenomenon, 
likes to refer to minds “not bounded by the skin” as if some sort of extra-biological 
process existed. I am too literal-minded to feel comfortable with such phraseology, 
which makes the process in question appear surreal. The process of interpenetra-
tion I am discussing is straightforward and biological.
My other difference from the distributed cognition folks is not a disagreement; 
I simply would like to push their insights further. Hutchins is famous for his dem-
onstration of the way the knowledge necessary to navigate a big ship is not held in 
the head of any one crew member; it is distributed in a group. In an action such as 
coping with an emergency, each individual does his job as best he can in the light of 
his own knowledge, but in doing so he relies on other individuals who have other 
bits of knowledge necessary to navigate the ship that he does not and does not need 
to have. This is what Hutchins calls distributed cognition. For this type of reliance 
3. It is also important to remember the importance of sharing of emotions, which is highly 
relevant to the argument of this chapter and goes in the same direction as the evidence 
on TOM. It is not considered here, but I hope to do so in another publication. See de 
Waal 1996.
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on the knowledge of others to be possible, the different individuals need to trust 
that the others know what they are doing and are well intentioned. This means that 
people can then act on what they know is incomplete knowledge, but which they 
trust is completed by the knowledge others have, to the extent of acting on that 
which they do not need fully to understand. It is not that they rely wholly on others; 
they rely on others at the very moment they rely on their own knowledge.
By using this particular formulation, I deliberately align what I am saying with 
the point made by a group of philosophers who, following Hilary Putnam and the 
“deference” theorists, stress that social life is based on trust of others; basically on 
the default assumption that these others with whom we are in contact are normally 
competent and cooperative. In other words, because of our theory of mind adapta-
tion, we continually interpenetrate as we communicate and hold as true informa-
tion that makes sense only because it is also contained or continuous with that in 
other minds (Putnam 1975; Burge 1993; Orrigi 2000). This is the nature of human 
cognition, which is essentially social. Such a state of affairs makes it possible that 
the content of knowledge stored in an individual is not to be understood nor con-
sciously sought to be understood, but this individual is likely to be aware of the 
solidarity on which the whole system of social cognition is based, and this may be 
greatly valued. This is a point to which I shall return.
* * *
I started this chapter by arguing that for all living things, humans included, the dis-
tinctness of the units of life is far from clear. Furthermore, I argued that for people 
this fact is commonly represented in the kinship systems that are about this reality 
in culturally varied and specific ways. For social animals the problem of the blur-
ring of individual boundaries is compounded by the very nature of their sociality. 
Individuals in social species are, to varying degrees, materially continuous with 
each other. Because humans are social animals, this problem applies to them. In 
their case, this state of affairs is brought about by the tool that makes human socia-
bility possible: the hard-wired human capacity referred to as theory of mind. Such 
an assertion, however, raises the same question that I touched on in the discussion 
of sex and birth: What are the cultural implications, if any, of this fact? The neces-
sity to ask this difficult question is precisely what is missing from much of the work 
of evolutionists such as Tooby and Cosmides (Cosmides and Tooby 1992) and even 
Rappaport.
The parallel with kinship may help to advance the argument, but at the same 
time it highlights an obvious difficulty. When anthropologists study kinship sys-
tems, they are studying representations of phenomena having to do with obvious 
empirical processes, of which no one can be unaware: going in and out of each 
other’s bodies. When we examine the interpenetrations of minds, however, we are 
dealing with phenomena not so easily consciously perceived. The continual mutual 
reading of minds on which communication depends is like grammar: it is and has 
to be subconscious, if only to operate at the necessary speed. But, if that is so, how 
is it possible that an awareness of this process could occur, a necessary step for it to 
take explicit form in cultural representations? To approach this question, I ask the 
reader to accompany me on a detour, away from purely theoretical considerations 
and toward a brief description of an empirical case.
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About a year ago, I decided to do a new (for me) type of field research in the 
remote Malagasy forest village in which I have been working on and off for nearly 
40 years. I carried out what is probably the most typical experiment used to dem-
onstrate the development of children’s understanding of TOM in front of any vil-
lagers who were available at the time; I then asked the adults watching to make 
sense of what they had just seen. By inviting them to give me their interpretation of 
what was going on, I placed my informants in the same situation as that in which 
professional psychologists normally find themselves in the lab. The experiment in 
question is usually called the “false belief task.” In the version I used, I showed a 
child two hats, and I placed sweets under one of them in the front of the child and 
everyone else present. I then asked a member of the audience to leave the house 
and, showing the child what I was doing, I switched the treasure to the other hat. 
I then asked the child—this is the key question—under which hat the person who 
had just gone out of the house would look for the sweets when they returned. The 
results in the Malagasy village were, as expected, much the same as those reported 
from all over the world. Younger children say that the person who left the house 
will look under the hat where the sweets actually are, while older children say that 
the person will look under the hat where he or she saw them put, but where, of 
course, they no longer are. This difference is usually interpreted by psychologists 
to mean that the younger child has not yet subconsciously understood that other 
people do not necessarily know what they know. To put it more theoretically and 
somewhat differently, the younger child has not yet subconsciously understood 
that people act in terms of their possibly false beliefs, not in terms of what the 
world is actually like.
The adult Malagasy villagers’ interpretation of the experiment was not all that 
different from that of professional cognitive psychologists. After a bit of prodding 
and reflection, the commonest explanation was that younger children have not yet 
learned to lie, so they do not understand that other people can also lie. For reasons 
that I cannot go into here, I take this to mean that the younger children are rep-
resented by them as naive empiricists, while they believe the older children and 
adults know that people can deceive and therefore look for the communicative in-
tention of the speaker because they do not simply trust appearances that could be 
manipulated by people.
I then used the discussion of the results of this experiment, which had been con-
ducted in front of villagers, as a springboard for a more general discussion about 
the nature of thought. During these continuing discussions, the villagers explained 
that thought was an activity through which one matched one’s action to one’s pur-
pose. Thought, they reasoned, is thus a feature of all animals. Fleas, for example, 
also think because they hide in the seams of garments in order not to get caught. 
Humans, however, are superior to other animals in that they have an extra tool—
language— that enables them to achieve the purpose of their thought more effi-
ciently especially through indirectness and deceit.
When I consider the very detailed information on mind, thought, and cogni-
tive development that I obtained through this work from the largely unschooled 
Malagasy in this remote village, I am, above all, struck by the familiarity of the ideas 
they expressed and their similarity with our own folk view. I am also impressed 
by the correspondence between their views and those of the psychologists. And, 
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indeed, when I look at the few other ethnographic studies of folk theories of mind 
and thought we possess, I find this general family likeness again and again (Gubser 
1965; Rosaldo 1980).4
These similarities inevitably raise the question of what causes such recurrences. 
The obvious answer is that they are triggered by an awareness of the same actual 
universal human cognitive process. This explanation, however, runs into the diffi-
culty discussed previously, that mental processes such as the workings of the mind 
operate below the level of consciousness while what I was told in the discussions 
that followed the experiments was clearly explicit and conscious.
But is this difficulty as serious as it seems? Or, to put it another way, following 
the arguments of a number of cognitive scientists (Jackendoff 1987; Block 1993; 
Humphrey 2002), is the barrier between the conscious and the subconscious as 
impenetrable as the objection assumes? The comparison with grammar, alluded 
to previously, suggests otherwise. When we speak to or comprehend others, we 
do not consciously obey grammatical rules; nevertheless, we can become aware of 
the existence of such rules when, for example, somebody makes a “grammatical” 
mistake. Indeed, it is probably as a result of such “mistakes” that folk grammarians 
the world over can build their theories. Although these folk grammatical theories 
vary probably because of a great variety of historical and cultural factors, it would 
surely be perverse not to accept that their obvious similarities are caused by the way 
grammar actually works and that this can be accessed to a degree.
The situation with theory of mind is probably similar, perhaps also based on re-
flection prompted by instances of faulty or difficult communication. For example, 
much of the general speculation about the nature of mind and thought in the data 
I collected In the Malagasy village was linked to explicit reflection on the abilities 
and limitations of a co-resident deaf and dumb man. It seems that this sort of more 
familiar and recurrent event causes the same kind of continual attempt to under-
stand the psychology of thought and communication as was artificially stimulated 
by my experiment. This is probably why villagers were so willing, enthusiastic even, 
to engage in the discussion of the experiment I had conducted once their initial 
resistance was overcome. The intellectual challenge it presented was not as unusual 
or bizarre as it might at first seem from the outside. Of course, this more ordi-
nary speculation was not done in the jargon of modern psychology, but with the 
cultural tools available. But even these unsophisticated tools and vocabulary must 
have been developed in relation to psychological processes that actually occur and 
are known to occur. It is not surprising, therefore, that similar ideas and representa-
tions should crop up, again and again, in different cultural and historical contexts. 
In making this claim, I am not arguing for any direct determinism between the 
actual working of the mind and people’s theories about it. Many other factors are 
clearly involved in each case. The working of the mind is difficult for the Malagasy 
to understand and represent, as indeed it is for any psychologist. It involves peeping 
past barriers of many kinds by means of thought or practical experiments, but both 
parties do this and for neither party is this completely impossible.
4. Rosaldo’s book, in fact, emphasizes the exotic character of Ilongot psychology, but I am 
struck that, in matters of cognition at least, Ilongot conceptualization is very familiar.
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To illustrate such complexity and to begin to approach the subject of religion 
and ritual, I return to my case study.
When the Malagasy villagers so emphatically insisted that thought always, di-
rectly or indirectly, was a matter of matching ends and means, I was naturally led to 
ask them about dreams. Were these not a case of thought without a practical end in 
view? The commonest answer I was given to such a question was negative. Dreams, 
I was assured, occurred when other people entered you and thought through you in 
order to achieve their ends. In this way, local cognitive theory was made coherent 
with a theory of interpenetration with which I had become familiar when I stud-
ied Malagasy ancestor worship. This is because it is through dreams that ancestors 
manifest themselves most typically, and make their desires known.
This local theory of dreams is radically different from what is found in many 
other cultures, including that of professional psychologists. This, however, does not 
mean that as soon as we touch on phenomena that are usually labelled religious, we 
inevitably move away from concerns cognate with those of professional cognitive 
science. The idea that dreams are really other people, especially ancestors, thinking 
through you for their own ends is part of that much more general idea that previ-
ous generations, dead forebears, living elders, or absent members of the family are 
speaking through you as you consciously or subconsciously “quote” them. Not only 
are you expected to utter the words of other wise people because you trust and rely 
on them. But a person’s forebears are thought to be continually acting through him 
or her. Indeed, to allow that to happen willingly is to show respect and to act morally. 
Morality is thus experienced, less as a matter of individual choice and more as a mat-
ter of submission and recognition of the presence of others who penetrate you. As 
soon as we rephrase the Malagasy concept of ancestors in this (to my mind) ethno-
graphically more accurate way, we find that we have returned to the familiar territory 
of scientific theories of distributed cognition and deference mentioned previously. 
In the very area in which my Malagasy co-villagers could be represented as most 
exotic—notably their beliefs in the power of ancestors—we find them very close to 
Hutchins and Putnam. Even their belief in the penetration of the young by elders 
and ancestors turns out to be built on an implicit recognition of the effect of inter-
penetration made possible by TOM—on the real fact that knowledge is distributed.
The point I want to stress is that the operation of theory of mind and the nature 
of the distribution of knowledge in society are neither unknown nor fully known 
by the Malagasy villagers I studied. Furthermore, they are aware of the unsatis-
factory partial nature of their knowledge, often commenting on this during the 
discussions that followed the experiments. And, as a result of their realization of 
the incompleteness of their knowledge, when the chance arises, as when I showed 
them the false belief task or when they observed the deaf and dumb man, they 
eagerly seize the opportunity to find out more about their own and others’ mental 
processes. In that inquisitiveness they are no different from professional scientists. 
Like them, their knowledge is incomplete, but also like them they strain to know 
more about a reality that, in the case of psychological processes, is common to all 
human beings and partly accessible. Of course, as in the case of the scientists, but 
probably to a greater extent, there are many other factors that interact with the vil-
lagers’ theoretical speculation and representations, and this multiplicity of factors 
produces systems that are only partly scientifically motivated. However, it is the 
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commonality of the enterprises and the reality of the world they engage with that 
explains the continuity between scientific discussion of such things as theory of 
mind and the cultural representations of largely unschooled Malagasy villagers and 
Western scientists.
The bodily interpenetration of TOM is thus, to a certain degree, known by 
Malagasy villagers, and this knowledge combines in varying ways and in varying 
contexts with other types of knowledge. This leads to partial continuities between 
scientific and folk understandings of the interpenetration of individuals and of the 
consequent provisionality of levels of individuation. It is to these that I now turn.
A central implication of TOM is that all social relation implies interpenetration, 
so the arbitrariness of boundaries within the social fabric applies not just to people 
who are related but also between all human beings who are in contact. Awareness 
of this ensures that ideologies of individualism are always, to varying degrees, ne-
gated by ideologies based on the realisation of interconnection, as Mauss stressed 
in his seminal essay on the gift (Mauss 1923-1924).
Knowledge of interpenetration and of the lack of clear boundaries, as well as the 
emotions that are an integral element of the way these phenomena are experienced, 
is what is meant by that most Durkheimian of words: solidarity. The presence of 
this sentiment, at its most general, is one that is difficult to put one’s finger on, be-
cause it seems rarely made explicit or the subject of reflexive discourse. However, 
from my reading of ethnography and from my own experience, it would seem that 
a default assumption in most cultures is that there is a potential moral obligation 
to any stranger with whom one might come into contact or, to put it in a different 
way, that the very fact of entering into a relationship implies being consubstantial 
and therefore morally obligated. Perhaps the most familiar manifestation of this 
phenomenon is the obligation of hospitality toward strangers, a moral imperative 
that recurs, admittedly in different forms, in so many unrelated cultures but that, 
as far as I know, has been little theorized at a comparative level by modern anthro-
pologists. This general unspecific morality is probably an epiphenomenon of the 
very nature of human communication.
There are, however, many instances of much more specific and elaborate aware-
ness of the lack of boundary between individuals. Many of them seem to fall in the 
domain that is usually labelled as religion, though some are of a less amiable and 
more threatening form. I have already mentioned the Malagasy interpretation of 
dreams and its link with ancestor worship. Ancestor worship is found all over the 
world in a variety of forms and is often linked to the lack of bodily differentiation 
within descent groups. Other examples are witchcraft-like ideas that often take the 
form of a belief in the secret and evil penetration of one’s body by a consuming 
other made possible by the existence of communication. More obvious still are 
beliefs in spirit possession that seem to crop up all over the world. These beliefs are 
an extreme representation of the colonizing nature of social relations because they 
involve the total invasion and replacement of one individual’s intentional mind by 
that of another.
In a somewhat different way, the realization of the interpenetration of individuals 
and of the context dependence of boundaries also seems present in many political 
movements and religions. The idea of a corporal unity beyond the individual is well 
documented for certain forms of Christianity, Islam, and devotional Hinduism. They 
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emphasize an alternative “brotherhood” to that based on interpenetration of sex and 
birth, thereby highlighting the comparability of the two types of interpenetration 
at the same time as using the one to challenge the other. These ideas become most 
explicit in the mystical forms of these religions, for example in Sufism or devotional 
Hinduism, in which the theme of the interpenetration of the bodies of the devotees 
and the lack of boundaries of their bodies takes an extreme and dramatic form.
Perhaps, however, it is in ritual that the conscious and culturally encoded aware-
ness of lack of boundedness is clearest. This, of course, was one of Durkheim’s key 
points, but what he stressed was the effervescence of highly dramatic rituals.
There is no doubt that feelings of transcendence of individuality and even of 
dissolution of self into a greater whole occur in many of the manifestations that 
we would label as ritual. Furthermore, these may well be part of the realization of 
the empirical lack of boundary of human individuals. However, many rituals are 
simply not like that. One universal feature of ritual, however, is deference, if only 
because it is at the very core of the meaning of the English term. Deference is, as 
noted previously, the acceptance of the content of other minds without necessarily 
knowing the whys and wherefores of the propositions and actions one performs. As 
argued in different ways by Putnam, Burge, and Hutchins, this is characteristic of 
knowledge in society and implies cognitive interpenetration. Ritual is an extreme 
case of this. In ritual one accepts that the motivation for meaning is to be found in 
others one trusts (Bloch 2004). In other words, it is not only that one surrenders 
one’s intentionality to others but also that one is aware of this happening. Recourse 
to ritual is therefore to be understood not only as awareness of neural interpenetra-
tion, a submission to other minds, but also as a celebration of such awareness.
Of course, religious and ritual representations are not simply realizations of the 
fact that we interpenetrate each other as we interact and that the boundaries sepa-
rating individuals are provisional and alterable. In each and every case, much more 
is involved that might indeed be more important in the particular case. I am simply 
saying that the social, sexual, and reproductive characteristics of the human species 
means that we go in and out of each other’s bodies in at least three different ways, 
and that this implies an indeterminacy of the level of relevant differentiation. In 
the case of birth and sex, the interpenetration is inevitably, though variously, cog-
nized. In the case of TOM, the matter is more complicated, however. The working 
of TOM is normally below consciousness as is also the interpenetration it involves. 
However, because the boundary between the conscious and the subconscious is not 
sharp and because we have tools to traverse it (such as experiments or the existence 
of deaf and dumb relatives), we can use our hazy awareness of the process to inter-
pret and speculate about such phenomena as dreams, the relation with ancestors, 
and many other central aspects of human life. This knowledge—the raw material 
of interpenetration—becomes a resource and an idiom that can become central in 
many representations that we would label as moral, religious, or ritual. It is this line 
of causation from the fact of interpenetration to its conscious representations by 
different people in different ways that makes it possible to slither from the biologi-
cal to the cultural, including the religious.
In so far as this causal chain involves a direct connection between the social, 
the moral, the religious, and ritual, such an argument is inevitably reminiscent of 
Durkheim’s theories. After all, the central argument of The Elementary Forms of 
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the Religious Life is that religion, by means of ritual, is a projection of the intuition 
of the dependence of the individual on society, and of the individual’s incomplete-
ness—an intuition that gives rise to the impression of the presence of a superior 
transcendental element: the religious (Durkheim 1912).
My admiration for this great anthropologist cannot but be heightened by the 
similarity of our arguments. Much of what I have said is what he said long ago, 
though from a totally different epistemological base. For this reason, it is also es-
sential to stress the profound difference between his argument and my own, if only 
to clarify the status of what I have been arguing.
Unlike Durkheim, I am not proposing a general theory of “religion.” Like most 
modern anthropologists, I do not believe that the term religion has any general 
analytical value. To seek the essence of religion would, therefore, inevitably run 
into the circularity for which The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life has been 
criticized. In any case, awareness of the provisional nature of individual boundar-
ies occurs in many kinds of cultural representations that could never reasonably 
be termed religious. For the same reason, I am not arguing that the interpenetra-
tions of kinship and TOM are the origin of the religious; any such claim would be 
meaningless because for me what anthropologists call religion is merely a ragbag of 
loosely connected elements without a common core.
Most importantly, however, I differ from Durkheim in his understanding of 
causation. For Durkheim the social, which comes from we know not where, myste-
riously causes the cultural, which then gives us the tools to invent what is, irrespec-
tive of what the world is like. This idealist fantasy would be worth elaborating only 
as a quaint example of an archaic conceit if it did not in my opinion still resemble 
much contemporary anthropological theorizing.
What I am proposing is more straightforward, more modest, more material-
ist, and anchored in evolutionary theory. The source of the social is to be found 
in the cognitive capacities of humans, though, of course, the evolutionary line of 
causation between the social and the cognitive is not unidirectional but rather, as 
argued by Humphrey and Tomasello, a single process. This socio/cognitive means 
that, even more than is the case for nonsocial animals and differently from the case 
for other social animals, the boundaries between human individuals are partial at 
best. This fact and our consequent bodily connectedness, which supplements and 
sometimes competes with the connectedness of kinship, are fuzzily available to our 
consciousness. It is this awareness that becomes a recurrent element in a great vari-
ety of representations in different cultures, representations that we must not forget 
are different kinds of phenomena from the simply psychological. It is these kinds 
of awareness that Durkheim examined under the label “solidarity.” And, further-
more, the types of solidarity he identified are often, though not always (as he also 
stressed) manifest in what we call religion and ritual.
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